The present paper describes recent research on two central themes of Keynes' General Theory: (i) the social waste associated with recessions, and (ii) the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. The paper also discusses some evidence on the extent to which fiscal policy has been used as a stabilizing tool in industrial economies over the past two decades.
Introduction
The purpose of the present paper is to describe some recent research on two themes that have a strong Keynesian flavor: (i) the social waste associated with recessions, and (ii) the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. Keynes analysis of both themes constitutes the core of the General Theory and, arguably, his most enduring contribution to economics.
As part of the recent revival of Keynesian macroeconomics, some authors have revisited both themes, taking advantage of the tools and concepts that have been developed and adopted in recent years. In the present paper I summarize some my own recent research on the costs of recessions and the stabilizing role of fiscal policy in the postwar period. The basic argument of the paper can be summarized as follows.
• Recent empirical evidence suggests that business cycle fluctuations are associated with large variations in the degree of aggregate efficiency in the economy or, in other words, in the distance to "first-best". That evidence is summarized in section 2.
• The presence of large efficiency gaps in periods of recession justifies the pursuit of countercyclical fiscal policies, with government spending being set at a level above that warranted by "efficient provision of public goods" considerations.
Section 3 develops a simple analytical framework which justifies the pursuance of countercyclical fiscal policies in a world in which recessions are associated with declines in aggregate efficiency.
• The empirical evidence points to the adoption of increasingly countercyclical policies by governments in OECD countries over the postwar period, as shown in section 4. In light of the arguments made in section 3, such trends in fiscal policy should be welcome.
Next I discuss each of the three themes in turn.
A New-Keynesian Perspective on the Welfare Costs of Business Cycles
In broad terms, and at the risk of oversimplification, one can think of two competing views of the business cycle. The first view, which I will refer to as neoclassical, is best exemplified in our days by Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory. Under that view, business cycles can be interpreted as the economy's optimal response to shocks, at least to a firstorder approximation. While some inefficiencies and distortions may be present in the economy, they are not viewed as central to cyclical phenomena. Most importantly, public authorities' efforts at stabilization may be counterproductive, and could even reduce welfare. As shown in GGL, given a parametric specification for the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution, it is possible to construct a measure of the gap or, to be more precise, of its fluctuations around its mean. The reader will find a derivation of The combination of the two findings described above can be interpreted as providing favorable evidence for the Keynesian view of business cycles: they point to large fluctuations in the degree of inefficiency in the aggregate allocation of resources, and suggest a systematic relationship of those fluctuations with the business cycles, with recessions corresponding to periods with unusually large aggregate inefficiencies.
GGL show that the gap variable can be written as (minus) the sum of two components. The first component, denoted by p t µ represents the wedge between (log) labor productivity and the (log) real wage, and has the natural interpretation of an average price markup, i.e. a measure of the deviation from perfect competition in goods markets.
The second component, denoted by w t µ is the difference between the (log) real wage and the (log) marginal rate of substitution, and can thus be thought of as a labor market wedge measure, reflecting distortions in that market (including non-competitive wage setting, as well as labor income and payroll taxes) . As shown in appendix A, and given our gap definition, it follows by construction that
Accordingly, and given the findings mentioned above, recessions must be associated, at least on average, with a higher wedge in goods markets, labor markets, or both. While the work of Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) , among others, had already stressed the countercyclical nature of price markups, the empirical analysis in GGL points to much larger variations in the labor market wedge, which appears to be the dominant source of fluctuations in the gap variable. That evidence suggests that recessions correspond to periods in which real wages are too high relative to the opportunity cost of working.
The previous evidence raises an interesting issue closely connected with Keynes' own perspective on the nature of recessions. It is clear that the well documented rigidity of nominal wages, together with the non-Walrasian nature of contractual relationships between workers and firms, may explain why real wages are so much higher than the marginal rate of substitution in downturns. Yet, it does not follow from that observation that making real wages fully flexible and, in the limit, restoring perfect competition in labor markets would suffice to restore a first best allocation. The reason is simple: to the extent that the enhanced wage flexibility is not accompanied by an increase in the level of economic activity that brings about an increase in the marginal rate of substitution (and/or a decrease in the marginal product of labor), the decline in the labor market wedge will just be offset by an increase of equal size in the average price markup. But in a world where firms do not perceive the demand for their goods as being perfectly elastic, the only way to increase economic activity and hours worked (and, as a result, to reduce aggregate inefficiencies) is for aggregate demand to increase. But that increase in aggregate demand will not be brought about mechanically by the lower wages; instead it may require that appropriate fiscal and monetary policies are undertaken to guarantee that a higher level of activity is attained. The previous discussion, based on GGL's analysis, has two natural implications for the design of macroeconomic policy. First, it provides a theoretical justification for countercyclical policies, at least to the extent that the business cycle involves fluctuations in the degree of efficiency of the aggregate allocation of resources. Yet, as it is clear from the expression above the gains from stabilizing the gap variable are of second order.
Thus, GGL estimate those gains to be always below one-tenth of one percent of annual consumption, for the range of calibrations considered.
The previous analysis, however, conceals an aspect of economic fluctuations that can have potentially important implication for the design of macroeconomic policy, potentially justifying activist countercyclical fiscal policies. The next section formalizes the previous idea, using a highly stylized aggregative model of optimal fiscal policy determination.
A Case for Countercyclical Fiscal Policy
The analysis of the gap variable and its fluctuations has an important additional dimension related to welfare that is worth emphasizing here. In a nutshell, the fact that fluctuations take place around a distorted (i.e., inefficient) steady state or balanced growth path implies that expansions and recessions will generally have first-order effects on welfare. To the extent that an increase in government purchases has an expansionary effect on the economy, there will be an incentive to raise that variable beyond what would be justified by a criterion based strictly on the efficient provision of public goods.
Furthermore, to the extent that the degree of aggregate inefficiency is larger in recessions than in expansion (as the evidence summarized above would suggest), the incentive to raise government purchases will vary with the cycle, leading an optimizing government to pursue a countercyclical fiscal policy.
The previous point can be illustrated by considering a highly stylized aggregative economy with preferences represented by the period utility 
Hence, to the extent that (i) the level of economic activity is inefficiently low ( 0), and (ii) the government spending multiplier is positive ( ), the optimal fiscal policy satisfies
We see thus that the optimal level of government purchases will remain above that associated with the simple criterion for the optimal provision of public goods, which in the stylized model above would require that the marginal utility of public and private consumption are equated. The reason is straightforward: in addition to satisfying the demand for public goods, government purchases can be used to increase employment, thus reducing the welfare losses resulting from an inefficiently low level of activity.
It is also clear from expression (2) that the incentive to raise government spending will be greater the larger is the multiplier and the lower (i.e., the more negative)
is the variable. How about taxes? While not formalized explicitly above, it is clear that distortionary taxes must be an important source of the efficiency gap. A simple way to represent that connection is to think of the gap variable as having two components: one related to (income) taxes and a second incorporating all other sources of gap variation (e.g., "pure" markups). In that context we would expect an optimizing government to use tax policy to reduce gap fluctuations. Thus if a decline in the gap occurs as a result of the higher markups induced, say, by the combination of an adverse demand shock and the presence of nominal rigidities, the government could in principle dampen the drop in the gap (and its first-order negative welfare effects) by lowering the tax rate transitorily and issuing debt, while waiting for an expansionary period to raise taxes again. If one combines that prescription for tax policies with the case for countercyclical government spending made above, it seems plausible to conclude that in an economy characterized by a distorted steady state and fluctuations in the efficiency gap, countercyclical government deficits should be desirable. Interestingly, and as described in the next section, governments in industrialized countries appear to have followed that prescription with increasing zeal over the past decades.
Some Evidence on the Role of Fiscal Policy as a Source of Increasing Macroeconomic Stability
Much recent empirical evidence points to a substantial decline in GDP volatility among industrialized countries over the past half-century. In the present section I summarize some of the findings contained in a recent paper by Roberto Perotti and myself (henceforth, GP), which shed some light on one particular dimension of that debate, namely, the changing role of discretionary fiscal policy as a stabilizing factor. 6 While the main objective of GP was to provide an assessment of the extent to which the constraints associated with the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact affected in practice the way European governments have conducted fiscal policy, our work also shed some light on the evolution of discretionary fiscal policy for a broader set of countries. In particular, we use annual data for the period 1980-2002 for eleven EMU countries (all current members less Luxembourg), three non-EMU members of EU (UK, Denmark, and Sweden; henceforth, the EU3), and five non-EU countries (Norway, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States; henceforth, OECD5), and estimate a fiscal policy rule of the form
where is the cyclically adjusted (or structural) deficit for year t (measured as a share of potential GDP),
is the year t-1 forecast of output gap for year t (i.e., the percent deviation of GDP from potential), and 1 t b − is the amount of outstanding debt (relative to potential GDP) in period t-1. The use of the output gap forecast and the lag of the debt/GDP ratio in the above specification implicitly (and realistically) assumes that decisions on the discretionary component of the budget have largely been made by the end of the previous year. Notice that a negative value of x φ indicates that policymakers use discretionary fiscal policy in a systematic countercyclical way: when cyclical conditions are expected to improve (i.e., when the output gap forecast rises), discretionary fiscal policy becomes more restrictive --the structural deficit falls. To estimate the above fiscal policy rule, GP replace
with t x , and instrument the latter using 1 t x − and the lagged value of the US output gap (the lagged EU15 output gap for the US). Table 1 reports estimates of x φ for each group of countries (EMU, EU3, and OECD5), drawn from the GP paper. The top panel shows averages of country-specific x φ estimates, while the bottom panel displays the corresponding estimates based on a panel regression. 7 The picture that emerges is reasonably similar for both sets of estimates.
With the exception of EMU countries in the first half of the sample, the evidence points to the existence of a systematic countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy, reflected in the negative estimates for x φ . Most interestingly, however, for the three sets of countries the 7 Details can be found in Galí and Perotti (2003) .
GP estimates identify a substantial increase in the absolute value of x φ , thus suggesting a much stronger response of fiscal policy to cyclical developments, in a stabilizing direction. The previous evolution is particularly relevant for current EMU countries, whose fiscal policy was on average procyclical before 1992, becoming countercyclical only in the second half of the sample (and despite the constraints associated with
Maastricht and the SGP). Table 2 reports similar evidence obtained by GP, but now focusing on recessions, and the strength with which governments have used discretionary policy to fight them. The starting point of the exercise consists of identifying for each country the years in which its output gap experiences a decline, during the three main global recession waves of the early 80s, the early 90s, and the early 2000s. For each group of countries and recession episodes Table 2 shows the (average) ratio between (i) the cumulative change in the structural deficit (measured as a share of GDP) over the recession period, and (ii) the cumulative change in the output gap over the same period. Since the latter is negative by construction, an increase in the structural deficit during the recession (i.e., a countercyclical policy response) corresponds to a negative value for the ratio reported. In addition the size of the ratio gives us an indication of the intensity of the discretionary fiscal response to each recession episode.
The picture that emerges from that exercise is consistent in many dimensions with the evidence discussed above, though some qualifications seem relevant. In particular, we see how, for the three sets of countries considered, the behavior of discretionary fiscal policy during recessions has made a transition from being somewhat procyclical to becoming countercyclical. On average, non-EMU countries seem to have experienced that transition in the early nineties. EMU countries, on the other hand, kept largely procyclical policies during the recession of the early 90s, which undoubtedly must have contributed to the size and persistence of the latter.
Overall the findings reported in GP and summarized above show little evidence that The evidence on fiscal policy described above complements some of the findings in the recent literature on empirical interest rate rules. That literature points to a significant role of monetary policy in the attainment of low and steady inflation and milder economic fluctuations, two features that have characterized the past two decades in much of the industrialized world. 8 The evidence in GP, summarized above, suggests that the improvement in the conduct of economic policies has not been restricted to the monetary arena: fiscal policy in much of the industrialized world seems to have left behind the days when it was a likely source of enhanced volatility, and may have instead become a stabilizing force.
Concluding Remarks
At the risk of oversimplification, one may summarize the theme underlying much of that the new Keynesian research program as follows: Keynes and his followers got it right, but they just did not have the tools. What Keynes "got right" was the notion that the fluctuations in the level of economic activity that we observe in industrial economies--and, most prominently, the recurrent episodes of recession and high unemployment-are, to some extent, undesirable and avoidable and that policy can be effective in limiting their negative effects. What Keynes did not have were the analytical tools that are available to us now and, in particular, the flexible dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models that are at the heart of much recent research on optimal policy in the presence of frictions of all sorts. The interest that such research has raised in policy institutions like the ECB, the Federal Reserve or the IMF (which are developing their own DGE models with nominal rigidities) suggests that we may be getting closer to establishing a strong connection between economic theory and macroeconomic policy. 
